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Highlights 
 Service capacity procurement of logistics service supply chain is 
analyzed. 
 Demand updating and loss-averse preference are considered in four 
models building. 
 The impact of loss-averse preference on supply chain member’s 
decisions is studied. 
 Conclusions are generated by four models comparison and numerical 
analysis. 
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Service capacity procurement of logistics service supply chain with demand 
updating and loss-averse preference 
Abstract: This paper studies the impacts of loss-averse preference on the service capacity 
procurement decisions with demand updating in a logistics service supply chain, which 
consists of one logistics service integrator and one functional logistics service provider. It 
starts from a basic two-stage Stackelberg game model, then, extends to three scenarios where 
either the integrator or the provider or neither of them has loss-averse preference. The impact of 
loss-averse preference on the decisions of supply chain members is discussed by comparing 
the four models. Our results reveal, first, the loss-averse preferences do not always affect the 
decisions of supply chain members. If certain conditions are satisfied, the logistics service 
integrator can benefit from its loss-averse preference. Second, the increased service level can 
affect the logistics service integrator’s procurement strategy and the functional logistics 
service provider’s pricing strategy. This effect is only related to the loss-averse preference of 
the functional logistics service provider. Last, under certain conditions, the total service 
capacity decreases with the increased service level, regardless of whether or not the supply 
chain members have loss-averse preferences.  
Key words: demand updating; loss-averse preference; procurement; service capacity; 
logistics service supply chain 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, e-commerce has been developing very quickly around the world and has 
created a massive demand for logistics. Majority of e-commerce companies outsource their 
logistics services, as it is very difficult for them to provide logistics services on their own. 
Thus, logistics service supply chain (LSSC) is formed. An LSSC usually consists of a 
logistics service integrator (LSI) and several functional logistics service providers (FLSPs), 
where LSI provides customized logistics services for e-commerce companies by integrating 
the service capacities of multiple FLSPs. FLSPs consist of traditional functional logistics 
enterprises, such as transportation and storage enterprises, among others. These FLSPs are 
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integrated as the suppliers by the LSI when the LSI trying to provide the integrated services. 
For example, LSIs, such as China P.G. Logistics Group [1], Chinese Yuantong Express 
Logistics Company [2], and Robinson Global Logistics Co., Ltd. [3], purchase transportation 
capacity and storage capacity separately from different FLSPs to provide a systematic 
logistics service to customers. Accordingly, capacity procurement is an important part in 
LSSCs. 
In practice, however, logistics service capacity procurement is not easy, especially when 
market demand updating and behavioral factors are taken into consideration [4]. For example, 
Chinese Yuantong Express Logistics Company, an LSI with more than 60 branches, provides 
integrated logistics services mainly to China Taobao Electronic Commerce. Taobao has their 
biggest sales promotion on November 11 annually. On November 11, 2015, the e-commerce 
turnover of Taobao was 91.217 billion RMB, 27.14 times that of the turnover in the 
corresponding period in 2011 [5]. All the branches of Yuantong collected 53,280,000 parcels 
(19.95 times of the parcels in the corresponding period in 2011) to be delivered to consumers 
located in 31 provinces in 3 to 5 days. To manage the sharp increase in logistics service 
demand, in October 2012, Yuantong pre-ordered capacity according to its demand forecast 
based on the e-commerce sales promotion, then purchased capacity for the second time in 
November when customer demand is realized [2]. If Yuantong finds that after updating the 
demand, the purchase quantity is too much, Yuantong will sell the remaining capacity at a 
lower price. However, the initial purchasing cost has been paid to his FLSP, which is regarded 
as a loss by Yuantong. On the other hand, it is expensive for his FLSP to expand their 
logistics capacity (such as purchasing transportation vehicles and constructing warehouses) if 
the logistics capacity is lower than the updating demand. Therefore, if Yuantong does not 
make use of the second purchasing opportunities to increase their purchasing capacity, his 
FLSP will be afraid that rush expansion of logistics capacity will cost too much and result in 
a loss of their profits. Consequently, the loss-averse preferences of both parties made it 
difficult for Yuantong to make effective decisions. Yuantong was under great pressure due to 
the sharply increased demand and FLSP’s inadequate service capacity preparation. 
Warehouse overflow, delayed delivery and damaged goods occurred. These problems were 
not resolved before the sales promotion period in 2015 [6]. This example reveals LSI’s 
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problems in building a scientific supply chain procurement strategy under sharply increased 
demand [7, 8]. 
From the perspective of theory, issues about supply chain decisions under demand 
updating and loss-averse have been studied individually. For example, in the research of 
supply chain decisions under demand updating scholars use the two ordering opportunities 
strategy to analyze the supply chain strategy [9, 10], and practical issues under complicated 
environments are explored [11-14]. Studies of strategies in supply chain with loss-averse 
mainly focus on supply chain coordination [15, 16] and inventory management [17] in 
manufacturing companies. The most relevant papers for this study are Ma et al. [18] and Qin 
[19], both of which take market demand updating and loss aversion preference into 
consideration. Ma et al. [18] built a model by punishing retailers who do not gain target 
profits and they provided optimal purchasing strategies for retailers. It focused on the fashion 
supply chain, but did not consider the properties of service and the combination of supply 
chain members’ loss aversion preferences. Qin [19] studied a loss-averse supplier under a 
push contract and a pull contract. This paper differs from Qin [19] in that this article mainly 
focuses on the related decision-making problems, such as pricing and ordering quantity in the 
logistics service supply chain instead of coordinating the supply chain.  
In addition, Service Only Supply Chain is a supply chain system in which the “products” 
are pure services, and physical products do not play a role, such as therapy, health care exams, 
financial consulting and fortune telling [20]. Logistics service supply chain is Service Only 
Supply Chain in the logistics field. The LSI purchases logistics service capacity, such as 
transport capacity and storage capacity, from  FLSPs. After integration, the LSI sells the 
integrated logistics service capacity to customers. Therefore, different from the previous 
literature about the supply chain decisions in manufacturing companies, this paper considers 
two important characteristics of the service supply chain. One is inseparability and the other 
is perishability: service production and consummation always occur simultaneously, and the 
service capacity cannot be stored after the selling season [21]. Under demand updating, 
market demand is not realized in the first stage, thus procurement of the LSI in the first stage 
is a pre-order and the FLSP does not hand over the functional service capacity to the LSI. 
While in a manufacturing supply chain, a retailer can purchase and store a product for selling. 
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The service level is the other important property of service. The LSI and FLSP must pay an 
additional cost to guarantee the service level required by customers. The service-level 
guarantee cost will be explained in detail in Section 3. Liu et al. [22], also relevant to this 
paper, considers demand updating and service quality guarantees when developing logistics 
service purchasing strategies. However, our paper focuses on pricing and ordering quantity 
problems in an LSSC and considers two important properties of service, which are 
inseparability and perishability. 
Accordingly, this paper attempts to explore the impact of the loss-averse preference on 
the LSI’s order quantity and the FLSP’s pricing strategy under demand updating, and tries to 
answer the three following questions: 
(1) How do the loss-averse behaviors of the LSI and FLSP affect the pricing and 
purchasing decisions? What if only one of the supply chain members has a loss-averse 
preference? 
(2) Do the loss-averse preferences of the LSI and FLSP definitely affect the optimal 
decisions of supply chain members? If not, what are the conditions? 
(3) Are there interactions between the loss-averse preference of the LSI and that of the 
FLSP? If so, what are the interactions?  
To answer the questions above, we consider a two-echelon LSSC consisting of a 
loss-averse FLSP and a loss-averse LSI that purchase logistics service capacity from the 
FLSP before and after demand updating (Supply chains often contain multiple LSIs, FLSPs 
and customers, LSIs and FLSPs cooperate to satisfy the customer demand, therefore the roles 
of LSIs and FLSPs are often discussed emphatically. Similarly, this study aims to explore the 
impact of the loss-averse behavior of supply chain members, and we also focus on LSI and 
FLSP). We build a basic model to maximize the utilities of the LSI and FLSP who both have 
loss-averse preferences. But in practice, there are special scenarios where only one side has 
loss-averse preference or neither side has loss-averse preference. These special scenarios include: 
(a) only the LSI has loss-averse preference, (b) only the FLSP has loss-averse preference, and 
(c) neither of them has loss-averse preference (the detailed cases can be seen in section 4.2). 
After comparing the LSI’s optimal procurement strategy and the FLSP’s optimal pricing 
strategy among the basic model and the three scenarios above, the impact of the loss-averse 
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preference on making the optimal decision is analyzed. In doing so, our paper makes the 
following three contributions: First, this paper takes both demand updating and loss-averse 
preference into consideration, exploring the interaction mechanism and a combination of 
these factors. Second, the current literature only considers the situation of one supply chain 
member having loss aversion behavior and studies the effects of loss aversion behavior in the 
case of complicated factors, such as asymmetric information [23] or sudden disruptions [24]. 
Conversely, this paper takes the loss aversion behavior of both the LSI and FLSP into 
consideration and explores the effects of loss-averse preferences with four combinations on 
supply chain decision making by comparing the optimal decisions in the basic model and 
three special cases. Third, this paper generates some unexpected conclusions. For example, 
the LSI can benefit from its loss-averse preference if certain conditions are satisfied. 
Additionally, the loss-averse preferences of the LSI and FLSP do not always affect the 
decisions of supply chain members. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the recent relevant 
literature. Section 3 provides the background for our study and develops a few necessary 
hypotheses. Section 4 builds a basic model (model I) and three special scenarios.  By 
comparing the basic model with the three scenarios, Section 5 discusses the effects and 
interactions of the loss-averse preference of the LSI and that of the FLSP. Section 6 is a 
numerical analysis. Section 7 provides conclusions, management insights, and future 
directions for research. 
2. Literature review 
The topics most relevant to our study are LSSC capacity procurement, market demand 
updating, and loss-averse preference. The most relevant existing literature related to these 
three aspects will be reviewed in Sections 2.1 to 2.3. 
2.1 Supply chain coordination under demand updating 
Current studies of supply chain coordination under demand updating focus on two 
aspects. One is the expression of demand updating. The other is two-stage ordering policies 
in supply chain under demand updating. The Bayesian updating method [12], conditional 
distribution method [25], and AR(1) process [10] are widely used to perform demand 
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updating.  
The more complex two-stage ordering policy based on the demand information updating 
has been paid increasing attention by researchers. Gurnani and Tang [9] studied a retailer 
ordering a seasonal product prior to a single selling season, and improved the forecast by 
updating demand and presenting a nested news vendor model for determining the optimal 
order quantity. Afterwards, many scholars extended the issue to more complicated situations, 
such as allowing retailers to purchase from external markets, studying single and multi-period 
quantity flexibility contracts in a spot market and discussing the impact of the forecast quality 
and the level of flexibility on the optimal decisions [11]. Based on this, service levels are 
considered [26]. Because the decision-making processes of supply chain members are often 
subject to various conditions, capacity constraints [13] and capital constraints [14] are 
introduced into the two-stage ordering policy. 
With the rapid change of market, such as e-coherence market in recent years, demand 
updating began to be incorporated into service capacity procurement decisions. For example, 
Liu et al. [22] studied the logistics service supply chain and explored the influence of demand 
uncertainty revelation and quality guarantee change cost on the supply chain members’ 
optimal decision making by comparing the four combinations of uncertainty complete 
revelation/uncertainty incomplete revelation (UCR/UIR) and GCC/no guarantee change cost 
(NGCC). The differences between this paper and Liu et al. [22] are in three aspects. First, in 
Liu et al. [22], the LSI purchases and sells service capacity in both periods, however, we 
study a one-period-two-stage process in which the LSI purchases service capacity in both 
stages, but only sells at the end of the second period. Second, although this paper and Liu et 
al. [22] both consider demand updating, this paper focuses on the purchasing quantity and 
pricing problem given two purchasing opportunities, while Liu et al. [22] attempted to 
determine the effects of the demand uncertainty revelation degree. Third, Liu et al. [22] 
studied the service quality guarantee, while we study loss aversion behavior. 
2.2 Loss-averse preference 
Behavioral operations in supply chains have been developed very fast recently and many 
behaviors have been considered in the literature [27]. As one typical behavior, studies of 
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loss-averse preference have shown that people are more averse to losses than they are 
attracted to the same-sized gains [18]. To extend the literature on supply chain, loss-averse 
has been introduced into the current supply chain decision-making models that focus on 
supply chain coordination with uncertain demand [15] and inventory management [19]. On 
one hand, scholars usually use contracts to solve the supply chain coordination problem with 
uncertain demand. for example, Wang and Webster [28] considered a decentralized supply 
chain and found that a special class of distribution-free GLB contracts exist to improve 
supply chain performance. Li et al. [29] conducted a mean variance (MV) analysis of a fast 
fashion supply chain consisting of one supplier and n risk averse retailers. They determined 
that a simple return contract can be sufficient to achieve coordination. On the other hand, in 
the study of the inventory management, loss-averse preference has also drawn the attention of 
scholars studying more complex factors, such as asymmetric information [23], sudden 
disruptions [24] and consumer loss aversion [30]. However, the current literature on the 
loss-averse preference has mainly focused on retailers [31] or manufacturers [32] in 
manufacturing supply chains, rather than on supply chain members in service supply chain. In 
practice, supply chain members often have loss-averse preferences. It is common for both 
supplier and retailer have loss-averse, it is more realistic to consider that both members have 
loss-averse preferences than to consider that a single supply chain member has loss-averse 
preference. Obviously, it is more likely to show the complicate influence mechanism and 
obtain the cross-effects of both members’ loss-averse preferences. 
Recently, interdisciplinary studies of demand updating and loss-averse preference have 
been conducted. Some scholars, such as Ma et al. [18] and Qin [19] have conducted 
exploratory studies. Ma et al. [18] built models by punishing decision makers (retailers) for 
not reaching their target profits.  They found that the optimal first-stage order quantity 
decreases as the penalty coefficient increases. The optimal first-stage order quantity always 
decreases as information is more accurate. However, their models focused on demand 
updating in the fashion supply chain and did not consider the combination of loss-averse 
preferences of the LSI and FLSP. Qin [19] studied how the supplier’s loss-averse preference 
and information updating affect the push contract and pull contract, but it did not focus on 
LSSCs. Qin [19] discovered that with no additional information updating, there is no 
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difference between the push contract and the pull contract for any wholesale price and the 
loss averse supplier. In addition, Chiu and Choi [33] studied the use of the mean-variance 
(MV) theory in multi-echelon supply chain problems and supply chain problems with 
information updating, to provide a better method to conduct the interdisciplinary studies of 
demand updating and loss-averse preference. 
2.3 Summary of literature review and model orientation  
From sections 2.1 and 2.2, it can be seen that demand updating and loss aversion have a 
crucial impact on supply chain decision making. Although the current research on supply 
chain demand updating and loss aversion is relatively abundant, the majority of current 
researches mainly focus on the manufacturing supply chain. Few scholars have focused on 
the influences of demand updating and loss aversion in the service supply chain. The most 
relevant research to this article is the study by Ma et al [18], Qin [19] and Liu et al. [22]. Ma 
et al [18] and Qin [19] consider both market demand updating and loss aversion by supply 
chain members. However, Ma et al [18] focus only on the fashion supply chain, but do not 
address the logistics service supply chain, service feature factors, and the behavioral mix of 
different members. Qin [19] only studies the contract coordination problem and does not 
consider the product pricing and order quantity decision-making problems and the service 
product features. Liu et al. [22] consider logistics service capacity purchasing decisions under 
the demand uncertainty revelation and quality guarantee change but do not consider the 
loss-averse behavior of supply chain members. 
In this paper, the research will focus on these issues and study service supply chain 
procurement capabilities in depth. We will build the service capacity purchasing model with a 
combination of loss aversion behavior to maximize the utility of the LSI and FLSP under 
demand updating and at a given service level. We obtain the optimal purchase quantity of the 
LSI and the optimal pricing strategy of the FLSP in different situations and analyze the 
effects of market demand updating and loss aversion on the optimal decision. 
3. Problem description and assumptions 
In this paper, we consider a two-echelon LSSC in which an LSI purchases logistics 
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service capacity from an FLSP. The LSI is faced with uncertain market demand and updates 
its demand based on the observed market signals. A uniform distribution can be used in 
demand updating problems [34], thus our paper supposes that market demand 
0D  is 
uniformly distributed before demand updating, with a cumulative distribution function (CDF) 
of  F x  and a probability distribution function (PDF) of  f x . At the beginning of the 
second stage, the LSI observes market signals and updates market demand with a conditional 
distribution method (the same method used by Iyer and Bergen [25]). The market signal 
ex  
can be thought of as the mean or variance of the demand [18, 34], so market demand 
1D  
after demand updating is also uniformly distributed (see Wang and Liu [34] for proof), with a 
CDF of  eF x x  and a PDF of  ef x x . The LSI must pay a demand updating cost Ic  
when updating the market demand. Ic  
is a constant and has nothing to do with the real 
purchasing quantity, especially when advanced information technology is used [35]. 
The LSI orders capacity in the first stage instead of procuring all the capacity in the 
second stage. In this way, buyers can adjust the procurement quantity based on the updated 
market information to best satisfy the market demand and obtain the most favorable prices for 
ordering in advance. The FLSP can obtain orders with a certain amount of purchasing 
quantity. In the first stage, the LSI orders service capacity 
1Q  from the FLSP and pays the 
scheduled cost 
1 1w Q  
(also the purchasing cost,
 1
w
 
is the unit wholesale price in the first 
stage). 
1 1w Q  is a payment to the FLSP to reserve the capacity for the LSI.  
To prevent the FLSP from not providing service capacity 
1Q  in the second stage, the 
scheduled cost translates into income for the FLSP once demand has been realized. A similar 
payment mechanism also exists in Taobao [36]. Additionally, the unit wholesale price in the 
first and second stage set by the FLSP has a range, similar to Gurnani and Tang [9], so the 
wholesale price is between  ,l hw w .  
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Notice that the cost of using logistics service capacity has two parts, one is the FLSP’s 
unit operation cost c , the other is the service-level guarantee cost. The unit operation cost is 
the cost under basic service level 0 , such as the sum of vehicle depreciation and unit fuel 
costs of transportation. On the basis of 0  ( 00 1   ), when customers require a higher 
service level, the total service level will be increased to 0  . The upper limit of the total 
service level is 1, so 01   . The additional cost needs to be paid for the increased service 
level  , which is called the service-level guarantee cost. The LSI and FLSP must work 
together to make sure the service reaches a certain level, so they have to share the 
service-level guarantee cost. Suppose the service-level guarantee cost contribution ratio of the 
LSI is  and FLSP 1  , respectively [37]. Thus, the unit service-level guarantee cost is 
  for the LSI and  1    for the FLSP.   is the coefficient of the service-level 
guarantee cost.  
Our paper considers the effects of the loss-averse preferences of both the LSI and FLSP 
on supply chain decision making. These loss-averse preferences will be described in Section 
4. Here, we make some basic assumptions: 
Assumption 1: The FLSP gives the LSI two procurement opportunities. To ensure 
cooperation between the FLSP and LSI, we introduce a minimum order quantity (MOQ). It is 
assumed that the LSI’s order quantity before demand updating is
1Q , 1Q  , where   is the 
MOQ before demand updating. 
 In the manufacturing sector, many manufacturers state their MOQ requirement together 
with their product information [38]. In the logistics service supply chain, FLSPs will make 
use of economies of scale when they operate and require that LSIs purchase more than MOQ 
to reduce the FLSP's marginal cost. The MOQ in the logistics service supply chain refers to 
the minimum purchase volume of the logistics service capacity. In practice, an FLSP always 
requires an LSI to order more than the MOQ to decrease the marginal cost and help to 
achieve economies of scale. For example, in the transportation service, FLSPs provide service 
with a standard unit of a truckload, container or case [39], which means the MOQ is 1. 
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Assumption 2: It is assumed that the FLSP is dominant in the LSSC.  
This is very common in logistics service such as the rail transport service. For example, 
China railway company (CRC), one of the largest state-owned logistics enterprises in China, 
is an FLSP in the field of railway logistics services. CRC has dominated the service supply 
chain when it cooperates with other Chinese LSIs, such as S.F. Express and STO. Express 
[40]. In addition, in other transportation modes, when there are always fewer FLSPs that 
could offer services to the routes characterized by remote locations, complex operations and 
difficult delivery of goods, in the practical logistics service, LSI must obey the specific 
arrangement of FLSPs. Therefore, the FLSP is assumed as the leader and the LSI as the 
follower [40]. 
Assumption 3: Under demand updating, to make sure the FLSP has enough capacity, 
the LSI shares the demand information with the FLSP, but the FLSP cannot arbitrarily 
manipulate wholesale prices. 
The information sharing between the FLSP and the LSI is often used in practice, for 
example, Chinese Yuantong Express Logistics Company receives demand information from 
its customer (China Taobao Electronic Commerce) and shares the information with its FLSPs 
to help the FLSPs prepare sufficient service capacity. What needs to be specified is that the 
FLSP will not increase wholesale prices arbitrarily. First, notice that the FLSP dominates the 
LSSC and needs to know demand information. In an LSSC, the LSI is the closest connection 
to customers and thus has the customer demand information. As a player in the upstream of 
the LSSC, the FLSP cannot trade with customers downstream directly in practice but has to 
count on the LSI to receive the demand. Second, the FLSP cannot manipulate the wholesale 
prices. The LSI’s optimal purchasing policy is related to a tradeoff between the loss caused by 
the mismatch between supply and demand, and the cost of the functional logistics service 
capacity. An excessive wholesale price set by the FLSP will cause the LSI to decrease the 
purchase quantity and decrease the purchase cost. Although this may cause an increase in the 
mismatch loss, the total cost paid by the LSI will still decrease. Third, long-term strategic 
cooperation is quite important in the supply chain. Even if the FLSP can earn extra short-term 
profits over the current period by setting excessive wholesale prices, the long-term 
cooperation with the LSI will be affected negatively, and so will be the FLSP’s long-term 
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profits. Thus, the FLSP cannot arbitrarily manipulate wholesale prices.  
 According to Assumption 2, Fig. 1 shows the decision-making process for service 
capacity procurement in an LSSC with demand updating and loss-averse preferences: 
Step 1: At 0t  , the LSI forecasts market demand and both obtain an increased service 
level  and service-level guarantee cost coefficient of  . Additionally, the service-level 
guarantee cost contribution ratio   is decided after negotiation. The FLSP decides the 
wholesale price 1w  in the first stage to maximize its utility according to the demand forecast 
shared by the LSI and gives 1w  to the LSI. 
 Step 2: The LSI decides the order quantity 1Q  based on demand forecast and wholesale 
price 1w  in the first stage to maximize its utility. The LSI pays the pre-order cost 1 1w Q , 
which is the payment to the FLSP to reserve capacity. 
Step 3: At 1t  , the LSI observes the market signal ex  and received the updated 
demand distribution  ef x x based on ex . The LSI shares the market demand after updating 
the FLSP, and the FLSP decides the wholesale price 2w  in the second stage to maximize its 
utility and gives 2w  to the LSI. 
Step 4: The LSI decides the order quantity q  in the second stage based on  ef x x and 
wholesale price 2w to maximize its utility. The total ordering quantity of the LSI is 2Q , 
2 1Q Q q  . The LSI pays the purchasing cost 
2w q  
for the second stage and the FLSP 
receives the total revenue
1 1 2wQ w q  
for both stages.  
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T h e  LSI predicts 
market demand 
long before 
consumer order 
arrives, and shares 
the  demand 
forecast w i t h  the 
FLSP
The LSI decides 
ordering quantity Q1 
in the first stage 
pays purchasing cost 
T h e  LSI observes 
market signal   and 
ge t s  the updated 
demand distribution. 
The LSI shares the 
market demand with 
the FLSP
The LSI decides 
ordering quantity q 
in the second stage 
and pays purchasing 
cost
T h e  FLSP decides 
wholesale price   in 
the first stage.
T h e  FLSP decides 
wholesale price   in  
the second stage.
Uncertain demand 
is realized and The 
LSI and FLSP get 
their profits.
t=0 t=1 t=2
ex
2w
1w
 
Fig. 1 Process of capacity procurement in an LSSC with demand updating and loss-averse 
 
The decision variables are the LSI’s pre-order quantity 1Q  
and total order quantity 2Q ; 
the FLSP’s wholesale prices in the first and second stages are
 1
w  and 2w .
The notations for 
the models are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1.  Notations for the models 
Parameter Description 
b  The unit stock-out cost of the LSI. 
c   The FLSP’s unit operation cost (under the basic service level 
0  )  
IC  Demand updating cost paid by the LSI 
 f x   Probability distribution function of market demand before demand updating 
 F x  Cumulative distribution function of market demand before demand updating 
 ef x x
 
Probability distribution function of market demand after demand updating 
 eF x x  Cumulative distribution function of market demand after demand updating 
q  The order quantity in the second stage. 
2 1 0q Q Q     
1Q  The order quantity of the LSI in the first stage of the basic model. 1
iQ
 is the 
order quantity of the LSI in the first stage of scenario i, where i=Ⅰ,Ⅱ,Ⅲ. 
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1HQ and 1
i
HQ  are the optimal order quantities under 0q  ; 1L
Q
and 1
i
LQ  are 
the optimal order quantities under 0q  . 
2Q  The total order quantity of the LSI in the basic model. 2
iQ  is the total order 
quantity of the LSI in scenario i, where i=Ⅰ,Ⅱ,Ⅲ. 
2HQ and 2
i
HQ  are the 
optimal total order quantities under 0q  ; 
2LQ and 2
i
LQ  are the optimal total 
order quantities under 0q  . 
1w  The FLSP’s wholesale price before demand updating in the basic model. 1Hw  
and 
1Lw  are the optimal wholesale prices under 0q   and 0q  , 
respectively.
 1
iw  is the optimal wholesale price in scenario i, where i=Ⅰ,Ⅱ,
Ⅲ. 
2w  The FLSP’s wholesale price after demand updating in the basic model. 2w  can 
be bigger or smaller than
1w . 2Hw  and 2Lw  are the optimal wholesale prices 
under 0q   and 0q  , respectively. 
2
iw  is the optimal wholesale price in 
scenario i, where i=Ⅰ,Ⅱ,Ⅲ. 
p  The constant unit market price p , which is the LSI sells its integrated service 
to consumers 
s  The unit income derived from disposing of surplus capacity at the end of the 
period.  
I  The LSI’s total profit in the two stages. Ij  is the LSI’s profit in stage 
j .  1,2j .  
I  The change in the LSI’s profit in the second stage. 
V  The FLSP’s total profit in the two stages. Vj  is the FLSP’s profit in stage j . 
 1,2j . 
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V  The change in the FLSP’s profit in the second stage. 
IU  The LSI’s total utility in the two stages. 
VU  The FLSP’s total utility in the two stages.  
  The FLSP’s loss-averse coefficient. 
k  The LSI’s loss-averse coefficient. 
   Service-level guarantee cost contribution ratio 
   Service-level guarantee cost coefficient 
   Increased service level 
m  The upper limit of market signal fluctuations 
 
 
4. Model building 
In this section, we consider the loss-averse preferences of the LSI and FLSP in the LSSC 
and build a basic two-stage Stackelberg game model (Model I) to maximize the supply chain 
members’ utility. Based on the basic model, we also discuss the dynamic pricing strategy of 
the FLSP in three specific scenarios: only the LSI has a loss-averse preference (scenario I), 
only the FLSP has a loss-averse preference (scenario II), and neither of them have loss-averse 
preferences (scenario III). After demand updating, the FLSP will not buy back from the LSI, 
meaning that the procurement quantity in the second stage is  2 1max ,0q Q Q  . Thus, our 
paper only discusses two situations: the LSI purchases service capacity in both stages ( 0q  ), 
or it only purchases capacity in the first stage ( 0q  ). 
4.1 Basic model 
4.1.1 Utility functions 
(1) The LSI’s profit function and utility function 
We first consider the profit function. In the first stage, the LSI places a pre-order 
according to the original market demand. Although the LSI pays the purchasing cost in the 
first stage, the FLSP does not hand over the logistics service capacity to the LSI. The market 
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demand has not yet been realized. Therefore, the LSI has neither received the income from 
disposing of the surplus capacity nor has it paid the stock-out cost for insufficient integrated 
service capacity. Furthermore, the LSI only places a pre-order and does not earn real profits 
in the first stage, so we call it the nominal profit. The function is as follows: 
   1 1 1 1 1 1min ,I Q p Q x w Q Q                      (1) 
In Eq. (1), the first item is the expected revenue, the second item is the purchasing cost 
in the first stage and the third item is the logistics service level guarantee cost of the LSI in 
the first stage. It should be noted that the total logistics service level guarantee cost Q  is 
shared by the LSI and FLSP. In practice, the LSI and FLSP need to work together to meet the 
customers’ service level requirements (such as the transportation time requirement). The 
FLSP is responsible for controlling the time of the transportation (such as road transport), and 
the LSI is responsible for the transfer of the different modes of transport, coordinating 
transport and transit, and providing the FLSP with a real-time customer requirement change. 
At the beginning of the second stage, the LSI observes the market signal ex  and gets 
the updated demand distribution  ef x x  based on ex . Notice that, although ex  is not 
deterministic, LSI can still obtain deterministic  ef x x  by calculation and determine its 
optimal purchasing quantity based on  ef x x . This is explained in Section 3, as we use the 
conditional distribution method (the same method used by Iyer and Bergen [25]) and the 
market signal 
ex  
can be thought of as the mean or variance of the demand [18, 34], so the 
market demand 
1D
 after demand updating is also uniformly distributed (see Wang and Liu 
[34] for proof), with a CDF of  eF x x
 and a PDF of  ef x x
. After demand updating, the 
LSI purchases the service capacity for the second time and the FLSP supplies the capacity 
before the demand realization at the end of the second stage. Thus, the second procurement is 
the real procurement, which is different from the first procurement. The LSI gains real 
revenue and its profit function in the second stage is: 
           
+ +
2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2min ,I IQ p Q x w Q Q Q Q b x Q s Q x C
 
          
 
(2)
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 In Eq. (2), the first item is the expected revenue in the second stage, the second item is 
the purchasing cost in the second stage, where  
+
2 1Q Q  is the expected purchasing 
quantity in the second stage. When the LSI does not purchase in the second stage, 
 
+
2 1 =0Q Q , otherwise,  
+
2 1 2 1=Q Q Q Q  . The third item is the logistics service level 
guarantee cost of the LSI in the second stage, the fourth item is the stock-out cost, the fifth 
item is the income of disposing of the surplus capacity at the end of the period and the last 
item is the cost for demand updating. 
We can calculate the total profit of the LSI at the end of the period using: 
            
+
1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2, min ,I IQ Q p Q x w Q w Q Q b x Q s Q x C 
 
           
   
(3)  
Next, we calculate the utility function of the LSI when it has a loss-averse preference.  
In Eq. (3), the first item is the expected revenue in the second stage, the second item is 
the purchasing cost and the logistics service level guarantee cost of the LSI in the first stage, 
the third item is the purchasing cost and the logistics service level guarantee cost of the LSI in 
the second stage, the fourth item is the stock-out cost, the fifth item is the income of 
disposing of the surplus capacity at the end of the period and the last item is the cost for 
demand updating. 
According to dynamic reference introduced by Popescu and Wu [30], the customers’ 
expected price in the current period is affected by the real price in the previous period, which 
is the dynamic reference point. Some scholars also use profits as reference points [19, 41]. 
For example, Qin [19] proposes that the utility function expression of loss aversion is 
 
 
0 0
0 0
,
,
W W W W
U W
W W W W
 
 
 
, 
0W  and W are the supplier’s reference level (e.g., his initial 
wealth) at the beginning of the selling season and profit, respectively,   is loss aversion 
coefficient. Similarly, in this paper, loss-averse preference of the LSI causes the LSI’s utility 
in the current stage to be affected by that in the previous stage. A similar effect also happens 
to the FLSP. Thus, here we consider the LSI’s profit in the previous stage to be the reference 
point of the current stage. In the first stage, the LSI does not have a reference point and thus 
shows no loss-averse preference. After demand updating, the LSI considers its nominal profit 
in the first stage to be the reference point to assess its real profit in the second stage and the 
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utility caused by the loss-averse preference is shown in the linear loss-averse utility function: 
    2 2 1 1I I I IU k k Q Q                     (4) 
In Eq. (4), k  is the LSI’s loss-averse coefficient. The loss-averse preference makes the 
LSI more sensitive to loss than to gain. Thus, when the LSI gains a higher profit in the second 
stage than that in the first stage, it has positive utility, and 0 1k  . When the LSI gains a 
lower profit in the second stage than that in the first stage, it has negative utility and 1k  , 
the larger the loss-averse coefficient k , the higher the LSI’s loss-averse level [19]. When the 
LSI’s profit in the second stage is equal to that in the first stage, it has no utility and 0k  .  
The utility of the LSI in the second stage consists of two parts: the LSI’s profit in the 
second stage, and its utility tied to its change in profit. Thus, the utility in the second stage is: 
   2 2 2 2I I IU Q Q k                       (5) 
Similarly, the total utility gained by the LSI after demand is realized also consists of two 
parts, the total profit and the utility tied to the change in profit: 
   1 2 1 2, ,I I IU Q Q Q Q k                            (6) 
It should be noted that the utility functions of the LSI and FLSP are separable because of 
the reference point effect. Thus, the model in this paper will be solved by using backward 
induction. 
(2) The FLSP’s profit function and utility function 
First, we calculate the profit function of the FLSP. In the first stage, the FLSP does not 
deliver service capacity to the LSI and does not earn real profit. The FLSP only gains 
nominal profit: 
    1 1 1 1 1V w Q w c                                 (7) 
In Eq.(7), 
1 1Q w  is the nominal revenue in the first stage,  1 1Q     is the 
service-level guarantee cost of the FLSP, 
1Q c  is the operation cost of the FLSP. Notice that 
the operation cost is paid by the FLSP to use its service capacity, while the service-level 
guarantee cost is an extra cost paid for the increased service level. The FLSP has to reserve 
the service capacity and will use it in the second stage. For ease of calculation, we assume 
that the FLSP pays the cost in the first stage. 
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The real profit gained by the FLSP in the second stage is: 
      
+
2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1V w Q w Q Q w c                    (8) 
In Eq.(8)，  
+
1 1 2 1 2Q w Q Q w   is the revenue in the second stage,  
+
2 1Q Q c  is the 
cost for using capacity in the second stage,    
+
2 1 1Q Q      is the service-level 
guarantee cost in the second stage. 
The total profit of the FLSP is: 
         
+
1 2 1 1 2 1 2, 1 1V w w w c Q Q Q w c                    (9) 
Next, we calculate the utility function of the FLSP. In the first stage, similar to the LSI, 
the FLSP’s utility function is equal to its profit function.  
In the second stage, the change in profit is: 
          
+
2 2 1 1 1 2 1 21 1 0V V Vw w c Q Q Q w c                     (10) 
The utility tied to the change in profit is: 
V VU                                       (11) 
where 0 1  . Here,   will not be greater than 1, because the LSI’s order quantity 
in the second stage is 0q   and the FLSP’s profit in the second stage cannot be smaller 
than that in the first stage.                       
The utility function of the FLSP in the second stage is:  
   2 2 2 2V V VU w w                         (12) 
Similarly, the total utility gained by the FLSP after the demand is realized consists of 
two parts: the total profit and the utility tied to the change in profit. 
   1 2 1 2, ,V V VU w w w w                       (13) 
4.1.2 Optimal procurement strategies in the second stage 
In this section, we use backward induction to solve the model. Accordingly, in Section 
4.1.2, we attempt to determine the optimal solution of the LSI and FLSP in the second stage. 
According to Assumption 3, the FLSP is the leader and the LSI is the follower. We used the 
Stackelberg solution approach to solve the model. In practice, the order of decision making in 
the LSSC is: the FLSP first determines the wholesale price of service capacity, and then the 
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LSI determines the purchase volume according to the wholesale price and market demand.  
For LSI, according to Assumption 3, we first determine the optimal total purchasing 
quantity 
2Q . When 1 2=Q Q , the LSI does not purchase service capacity in the second stage. 
Thus, we only consider the situation of 
1 2Q Q . 
The LSI’s utility in the second stage is: 
 2 2 2I I IU Q k    
For FLSP, when 
1 2=Q Q , the LSI does not purchase service capacity in the second stage, 
thus the actual profit of the FLSP in the second stage equals to its nominal profit in the first 
stage. 
2 1 1
=V Q w  
The FLSP’s utility in the second stage is: 
 
2 2
1 1 1 1
V V VU
Q w Q c

   
   
     
 
The FLSP’s utility in the second stage is independent of 
2w . 
According to assumption 2, 
2w  
can be an arbitrary value which satisfies: 
2 ( , )H l hw w w  
When 
1 2Q Q , the actual profit of the FLSP in the second stage is: 
      2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1V w Q w Q Q w c          
The FLSP’s utility in the second stage is: 
2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1( ) (1 )( ( )( (1 ) )) ( (1 ) )VU w Q w Q Q w Q w                
After derivation and calculation, we obtain the optimal solutions of LSI and FLSP in the 
second stage, as shown in Proposition 1.  
Proposition 1: In the second stage, the optimal solution of the LSI is: when 
1 2<Q Q , then 
1 2
2 ( | )L e
p b w
Q F x
p b s
   
 
.
 
And the optimal solution of the FLSP is: when 
1 2=Q Q , 
then 
2 ( , )H l hw w w ; when 1 2Q Q , then 2 2 1( ) ( | )( ) (1 )L L L ew Q Q f x x p b s         . 
The proof of Proposition 1 is shown in Appendix A. 
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4.1.3 Optimal procurement strategies in the first stage 
Section 4.1.3 will attempt to determine the optimal solutions of the LSI and FLSP in the 
first stage. 
For LSI, when 
1 2=Q Q , the total utility of the LSI is: 
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
( ) (1 )( min( , ) ( ) ( ) )
( 1)( ) min( , )
I IU Q p Q x b x Q s Q x c
w Q p Q y
k
k k
       
   
 
And when 
1 2Q Q , the total utility of the LSI is: 
1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2
1 1 1
( , ) (1 )( min( , ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) )
( 1)( ) min( , )
I L IU Q Q p Q x w Q Q b x Q s Q x c
w Q
k
Qk pk y


          
     
 For FLSP, when 
1 2=Q Q , the total utility of the FLSP is: 
 1 1 1( 1) (1 )VU Q w Q c        
When 
1 2Q Q , the total utility of the FLSP is:  
1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1( , ) (1 )( )( (1 ) ) (1 )VU w w Q w Q Q w Q               
After derivation and calculation, we obtain the optimal solutions of LSI and FLSP in the 
first stage, as shown in Proposition 2. The proof is shown in Appendix B. 
Proposition 2: In the first stage, the optimal solution of the LSI is: when 
1 2=Q Q , then 
1 1 1
1
(1 )( ) ( 1)( ) (1 ( ))
( | )
(1 )( )
H
H e
p b w p F Q
Q F x
p b
k k k
k s
       
  
;
 
when 
1 2Q Q , then 
1LQ  ,   is MOQ. And the optimal solution of the FLSP is: when 1 2=Q Q , if 1k  , then 
1H hw w , if 1k  , then 1 1
(1 )( ) ( | ) ( )
(1 ) (1 )
1
e
H H
p b s fk x x pf x
w
k
k
Q    
   
   

. 
When 
1 2Q Q , then 1L hw w . 
4.2 Special cases of the basic model 
We have studied the optimal strategies when both the LSI and FLSP have loss aversion 
preferences. However, in practice, there are situations where only one side has a loss aversion 
preference or neither side has a loss aversion preference.  
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For example, in the cooperation between China Railway Company (CRC) and S.F. Express, 
CRC is the FLSP in the field of railway logistics services and S.F. Express is the LSI. In July 
2014, they began their cooperation by launching special e-commerce trains operating on the 
existing Shanghai–Shenzhen, Beijing–Guangzhou and Beijing–Shanghai railway lines. The 
special trains were contracted to S.F. Express [40]. As a state-owned sole proprietorship managed 
by the central government, CRC provided the diversified services such as passenger and freight 
transport services, national railway network construction and import and export business, and 
does not pay much attention to managing its logistics business in these three lines, which only 
accounts for a small part of its annual sales. Thus, CRC does not have a loss aversion preference 
in the cooperation with S.F. Express. However, for S.F. Express, the Shanghai–Shenzhen, 
Beijing–Guangzhou and Beijing–Shanghai lines are important and valuable lines. Accordingly, 
S.F. Express tries to avoid losses on these lines. In this situation, the two players are a loss averse 
LSI and non-loss averse FLSP.  
In the case of Tianjin SND Logistics Company, a professional LSI, and its FLSPs, the LSI 
does not have a loss aversion preference, while the FLSPs do have a loss aversion preference. 
The FLSPs can dominate the supply chain in the situation where there are fewer providers that 
offer service to the routes characterized by remote locations, complex operations and difficult 
delivery of goods, such as Tianjin-Henan. The services of remote locations only account for a 
small part of SND’s total services, however, these services are of vital importance to the FLSPs, 
as these FLSPs are small local providers. Thus, the FLSPs are highly loss averse, while Tianjin 
SND Logistics Company is loss neutral.  
There is also a case where both the LSI and the FLSP are loss neutral. China Post Group 
Corporation (CPGC) is a state-owned FLSP company with a history of more than 120 years of 
providing common postal services and commercialize competitive postal services. In November 
2017, CPGC and CRC signed a strategic cooperation agreement in Beijing. They established a 
long-term new type of strategic partnership to take advantage of their abundant resources in terms 
of logistics, information, finance and capital. They achieved convergence and expansion of their 
business by integrating CRC’s railway transport capacity with CPGC’s terminal delivery 
capability. Both CRC and CPGC are large enterprises with standardized and scientific 
decision-making processes. Thus, they do not have a loss aversion preference in their 
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cooperation. 
According to the three situations above, this section will determine the LSI’s optimal 
purchasing strategies and the FLSP’s optimal pricing strategies when one or both sides do not 
have loss-averse preferences. This section expands the basic model to three specific scenarios: 
Scenario I, where the LSI has a loss-averse preference, but the FLSP does not ( 0  ); Scenario II, 
where the FLSP has a loss-averse preference ( 0k  ), but the LSI does not; Scenario III where 
neither the LSI nor the FLSP have loss-averse preferences ( 0, 0k    ). As is operated in 
practice, after demand updating, the FLSP will not buy back from the LSI, meaning that the 
procurement quantity in the second stage is  2 1max ,0q Q Q  . Thus, our paper only 
discusses two situations: the LSI purchases service capacity in both stages ( 0q  ), or it only 
purchases capacity in the first stage ( 0q  ). As the solving methods in special cases are the 
same as that in the basic model, we omitted the solving process and directly conclude the 
optimal decisions in Table 2 and 3. From Table 2 and Table 3, we find that in each case, the 
LSI and the FLSP can choose 
2 0q   or 2 0q  . The two choices and their optimal 
procurement and pricing are sufficient and necessary. That is, when the LSI and the FLSP 
make an optimal decision in the first stage, if the LSI purchases more capacity in the second 
stage or not has been decided.
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Table 2 Comparison of the LSI’s procurement strategies for the basic model and three special scenarios 
 
1Q  2Q  
Basic 
Model 
0q   1LQ   1 2
2 ( | )L e
p b w
Q F x
p b s
   
 
 
0q           
  
1 11
1
1 1 1
1
H
H e
k p b k w kp F Q
Q F x
k p b s


       
  
    
 2 1H H
Q Q  
Scenario 
Ⅰ 
0q   
1LQ 
Ⅰ
 
21
2 ( | )eL
p b w
Q F x
p b s
   
 
Ⅰ
Ⅰ
 
0q           
  
1 11
1
1 1 1
1
H
I I
I
H e
k p b k w kp F Q
Q F x
k p b s


       
 
   
 
 2 1H HQ Q
Ⅰ Ⅰ
 
Scenario 
Ⅱ 
0q   
1LQ 
Ⅱ
 
21
2 ( | )eL
p b w
Q F x
p b s
   
 
Ⅱ
Ⅱ
 
0q   
11
1 ( | )eH
p b w
Q F x
p b s
   
 
Ⅱ
Ⅱ
 
2 1H HQ Q
Ⅱ Ⅱ
 
Scenario 
Ⅲ 
0q   
1LQ 
Ⅲ
 
21
2 ( | )eL
p b w
Q F x
p b s
   
 
Ⅲ
Ⅲ
 
0q   
11
1 ( | )eH
p b w
Q F x
p b s
   
 
Ⅲ
Ⅲ
 
2 1H HQ Q
Ⅲ Ⅲ
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
28 
 
Table 3 Comparison of the FLSP’s pricing strategies for the basic model and three special scenarios 
 
1w  2w  
Basic 
Model 
 
0q   
1L hw w  2 2 1( ) ( )( ) (1 )L L L ew Q Q f x x p b s c          
0q   
( ) 1g k    1H h
w w  2 ( , )H l hw w w  
0q 
 
( ) 1g k   
 1 1
(1 )( ) ( ) ( )
(1 ) (1 ) +
1
e
H H
k p b s f x x kpf x
w Q c
k
   
   
   

 
Scenario 
Ⅰ 
0q   
1L hw w
Ⅰ
 2 2 1( ) ( )( ) (1 )L L L ew Q Q f x x p b s c        
Ⅰ Ⅰ Ⅰ
 
0q   
( ) 1g k   
1H hw w
Ⅰ
 
2 ( , )H l hw w w
Ⅰ
 
0q   
( ) 1g k   
1 1
(1 )( ) ( ) ( )
(1 )
1
e
H H
k p b s f x x kpf x
w Q c
k
  
   
   

Ⅰ Ⅰ
 
Scenario 
Ⅱ 
0q   
1L hw w
Ⅱ
 2 2( ) ( )( ) (1 )L L ew Q f x x p b s c         
Ⅱ Ⅱ
 
0q           1 1 1 1H H
II II
ew Q p b s f x x c            2 ( , )H l hw w w
Ⅱ
 
Scenario  
Ⅲ 
0q   
1L hw w
Ⅲ
 2 2( ) ( )( ) (1 )L L ew Q f x x p b s c         
Ⅲ Ⅲ
 
0q        1 1 1H H ew Q p b s f x x c       
Ⅲ Ⅲ
 
2 ( , )H l hw w w
Ⅲ
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5. Discussion 
5.1 The impacts of loss-averse on pricing and order quantity 
5.1.1 The impacts of the LSI’s loss-averse preference 
Different conditions influence the impact of the LSI’s loss-averse preference on 
the supply chain members’ decision making. In this section, we discuss the conditions 
under which the LSI’s loss-averse preference can affect supply chain decisions and 
the nature of that effect. 
Theorem 1: When 0q  , in comparing the basic model and scenarios I–III, we 
get: 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
;
;
L L L L L L L L
L L L L L L L L
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q
w w w w w w w w
     
     
Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ
Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ
 
The proof is shown in Appendix C. 
Theorem 1 shows that, when the LSI purchases service capacity in both stages, 
the LSI’s loss-averse preference does not affect the LSI’s optimal purchasing 
quantities and the FLSP’s optimal wholesale prices. This may be because the LSI 
chooses to buy, in both stages, when the future demand is bullish, loss aversion 
preference brings positive benefits to the LSI and FLSP and thus does not impact 
optimal decisions.  
Theorem 2: Under the condition of 0q  , when:  
2 ( ) (1 ( ))kpf x kp F       
is satisfied, then: 1 1H HQ Q
Ⅰ Ⅲ  
The proof is shown in Appendix D. 
Theorem 2 shows that when the LSI only purchases service ability in the first 
stage, under the appropriate conditions, the loss aversion of the LSI will cause the 
LSI’s total purchasing quantity to increase. Therefore, for the loss-averse integrator 
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who buys only in the first stage, the total purchase quantity should be appropriately 
increased to obtain the best procurement effect. 
Theorem 3: Under the condition of 0q  ,  
if 1k 
,
  
1 1H Hw w
Ⅰ Ⅲ  
if 1k  , and the condition in Theorem 2 and  
( ) (2 )( ) ( ) 0ekpf x k p b s f x x      
are all satisfied, then 
1 1H Hw w
Ⅰ Ⅲ . 
The proof is shown in Appendix E. 
Theorem 3 demonstrates the effects of the LSI’s loss aversion preference when 
the FLSP is loss neutral. It shows that the LSI can benefit from its own loss aversion 
preference when 0q  . Theorems 2 and 3 demonstrate that, when the FLSP does not 
have a loss-averse preference, the loss-averse preference of an LSI that only 
purchases in the first stage can increase the LSI’s order quantity and make the FLSP 
set a lower price. Under this condition, therefore, loss-averse preferences are 
beneficial to the LSI. The FLSP can also make use of the LSI’s loss-averse preference 
to set a higher price when 0q   and 1k  . 
5.1.2 The impacts of the FLSP’s loss-averse preference 
From Theorem 1 we find that: 
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
L L L L L L L L
L L L L L L L L
Q Q Q Q w w w w
Q Q Q Q w w w w
   
   
Ⅰ Ⅰ Ⅰ Ⅰ
Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅱ Ⅲ
 
Thus, when 0q  , the loss-averse preference of the FLSP has no effect on the 
LSI’s procurement strategy or on the FLSP’s pricing strategy. 
Furthermore, when 0q   and 1k  , the FLSP’s loss-averse preference cannot 
affect supply chain decisions, as:
1 1 1 1H H h H Hw w w and Q Q  
Ⅰ Ⅰ
.
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We can conclude that the effects of the FLSP’s loss-averse preference are limited. 
However, the FLSP’s loss-averse preference can affect the supply chain members’ 
decision making under certain conditions. 
Theorem 4: When 0q   and 1k 
,
 
1 1H HQ Q
Ⅰ   
1 1H Hw w
Ⅰ   
and  
1 1 1 1H H H HQ Q w w 
Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅱ Ⅲ
 
Theorem 4 shows that when the LSI only purchases in the first stage, the FLSP’s 
loss-averse preference will affect the decisions of the supply chain members, 
regardless of whether or not the LSI has a loss-averse preference. To be specific, the 
FLSP’s loss-averse preference causes the wholesale price to increase and the order 
quantity to decrease in stage one. It should be noted that the LSI's loss aversion 
coefficient 1k   indicates that the profit of the LSI' in the second stage is less than 
the profit in the first stage, and the LSI has negative utility. As a result, the FLSP's 
loss aversion at this time has a negative impact on the LSI's utility. In addition, the 
LSI's purchasing quantity decreases due to the loss aversion preference of the FLSP. 
Accordingly, the FLSP should note when its loss-averse preference affects the supply 
chain decision making, and adjust its pricing strategy accordingly. A similar study is 
also mentioned in Özer et al. [42]. Özer et al. [42] studied the effect of risk aversion 
on manufacturing firms in the production supply chain and found that the risk-averse 
coefficient will affect the manufacturer's choice of contract and increase the advance 
purchase quantity and, hence, reduce the profit volatility. A manufacturer with higher 
risk aversion offers a greater discount.  
Overall, the loss-averse preference of the LSI can more easily affect supply chain 
decision making than that of the FLSP.  
Theorem 4 can be proven with a method similar to that found in Appendix F. 
5.2 The impacts of service level parameters on pricing and order 
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quantity 
Theorem 5: When the FLSP does not have a loss-averse preference, 
(1)  The LSI’s total order quantity decreases with increased service level  ; 
(2) When 
1
0
2
  : If 0q  , the wholesale price in the first stage increases with 
the increased service level   (when the LSI has loss-averse preference and 1k  ); 
If 0q  , the wholesale price in the second stage increases with the increase in 
service level  . 
Theorem 5 can be easily understood. For the LSI, the increase in   will 
increase its cost and decrease its total order quantity. When 
1
0
2
  , the LSI pays a 
small portion of the logistics service-level guarantee cost, while the FLSP pays most 
of the cost. Thus, the increase in   will cause the FLSP’s wholesale price to increase. 
Theorem 5 also indicates that when 
1
2
  , the FLSP’s wholesale price decreases 
with the logistics service-level. As the LSI’s total order quantity also decreases with 
the service level, the FLSP’s profit will decrease when 
1
2
 
.
As a result, when 
0q  , a service-level guarantee cost contribution ratio 
1
0
2
 
 
is more beneficial 
to the FLSP.  
Theorem 5 can be proven in Appendix F. 
Theorem 6: When the FLSP has a loss-averse preference 
(1) The LSI’s total order quantity decreases with the increased service level  ; 
(2) If 0q   and (1 )(1 ) 0       , the wholesale price in the first stage 
increases with the increased service level   (when the LSI has a loss-averse 
preference and 1k  ). 
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(3) If 0q   and 
1
0
2
  , the wholesale price in the second stage increases with 
the increased service level  . 
Theorems 5 and 6 demonstrate that the increased service level can affect the 
LSI’s procurement strategy. However, this effect has nothing to do with the loss 
averse preference of the LSI and FLSP. The increased service level can affect the 
FLSP’s pricing strategy under certain conditions. This effect depends not on the LSI, 
but on whether the FLSP has a loss-averse preference. Thus, both sides should pay 
attention to the contribution ratio of the logistics service-level guarantee cost, which 
can affect the costs for both sides and the FLSP’s pricing. 
In summary, in this section, we analyze the impacts of LSI and FLSP’s 
loss-averse on pricing and order quantity, and the impacts of service level parameters 
on pricing and order quantity. Although there are some related studies taking market 
demand updating and loss-averse preference into consideration, such as Ma et al. [18] 
and Qin [19], Ma et al. [18] did not consider the properties of service and the 
combination of supply chain members’ loss aversion preferences. Qin [19] focused on 
coordinating the supply chain. This paper is different from them. We more focus on 
the impact of loss-averse preference and service level on the decision-making of 
supply chain members in the service supply chain. With the comparisons mentioned 
above, the comprehensive impacts are generated which are not shown in previous 
literature. 
 
6. Numerical analysis 
Tables 2 and 3 show the optimal purchasing quantities and optimal wholesale 
prices when supply chain members use two different types of strategies ( 0q  and 
0q  ). However, we have not proven whether the optimal purchasing quantities 
1Q  
and 
2Q  satisfy the relationship above. In this section, we use Matlab 2018R to 
conduct a numerical analysis to verify the existence of the LSI’s and FLSP’s optimal 
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strategy, and explore some other conclusions.  
Based on the method of numerical analysis used by Wang and Liu [34], we 
assume that the demand before updating is uniformly distributed and 
0 0~ ( , )F U   . 
Suppose that market signal 
ex  is the mean and the CDF of market signal ex is ( )G  , 
~ (0, )G U m . m  is the upper limit of market signal ex  fluctuations. In practice, 
there are many ways for the LSI to obtain market signals. For example, in October of 
each year, Yuantong Express, the Chinese LSI mentioned in the section of the 
introduction, puts the initial order to the FLSP according to the market demand 
prediction prepared for the Singles’ Day. From October to November, Taobao 
customers continue to book, purchase and change their orders, and the market demand 
for logistics services also keeps changing. Taobao will share the updated demand 
information with Yuantong Express. Demand updating cannot change the distribution 
pattern of the market demand, which means that after updating, the demand is also 
uniformly distributed and 
1 1~ ( , )F U   . According to Wang and Liu [34], 
1 0 4(0.5 )em x    1 0 4(0.5 )em x     and the LSI and the FLSP make 
decisions according to the newly updated demand. Similar to Wang and Liu [34], we 
set the basic parameters as: demand parameters 
0 1000  , 0 3000  , 800  , 
demand updating cost paid by the LSI =25IC , market price of the integrated logistics 
service provided 60p  , unit salvage of unsold service capacity 10s  , unit 
stock-out costs for the LSI 5b  , unit operation cost for the FLSP 10c  , 
service-level guarantee cost coefficient 10  , service-level guarantee cost 
contribution ratio 0.2  , basic service level 
0 =0.2 , increased service level 
0.75  , lower limit of wholesale price 10lw  , upper limit of wholesale price 
45hw  , market signal parameter 500m  . 
6.1 The LSI has two types of purchasing strategies 
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In this section, we prove that the LSI has two types of purchasing strategies. It 
can purchase service capacity only in the first stage or in both stages with different 
demand updates.  
Fig. 2 shows the LSI’s utility in the basic model. Based on our parameter setting, 
when 0q  , the LSI can make more profit in the second stage and 0.7k  ; when 
=0q , the LSI makes more profit in the first stage and 3.1k  . Fig. 2 shows that the 
optimal decision changes with market signal 
ex . The LSI should not take the second 
purchasing opportunity, instead, should purchase all service capacity in the first stage 
when 370ex  . If the market signal is quite large, such as 370ex  , the LSI should 
purchase more capacity in the second stage. 
0 100 200 300 400 500
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0
5
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20
x 10
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x
e
U
I
 
 
q>0
q=0
 
 
Fig. 3-6 show the LSI’s optimal choice when the FLSP does not have a 
loss-averse preference, when the LSI does not have a loss-averse preference and when 
neither of them have loss-averse preferences.  
 
Fig. 2 Utility function of the LSI in the Basic Model,  =0.7  
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From Fig. 2 to Fig. 6, we find that the LSI’s optimal strategy changes with the 
market signal
ex . By comparing Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, we find that when the LSI does not 
have a loss-averse preference, the loss-averse preference of the FLSP can bring higher 
utility to the LSI. Comparing Fig. 6 with Fig. 3, when FLSP does not have a 
loss-averse preference, the LSI’s utility increases if the loss-averse coefficient 1k  , 
150ex   and the LSI purchases capacity in the second stage, the LSI’s utility 
decreases if the loss-averse coefficient 1k  , 150ex   and the LSI gives up the 
second purchasing opportunity. Comparing Fig. 6 with Fig. 4, the LSI’s utility 
increases if 1k   and the LSI only purchases capacity in the first stage. Thus, 
Theorems 2 and 3 are verified. By comparing Fig. 6 with Fig. 2, we find that the LSI 
can benefit from loss-averse preferences of the LSI and FLSP, as its utility increases 
Fig. 3 Utility function of the LSI in 
Scenario I, k  =1.9 
Fig. 4 Utility function of the LSI in 
Scenario I, k  =0.95 
Fig. 5 Utility function of the LSI in 
Scenario II,  =0.27 
Fig. 6 Utility function of the LSI in 
Scenario III  
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greatly. 
6.2 The FLSP has two types of pricing strategies 
In this section, we numerically show that the FLSP has two types of pricing 
strategies. In practice, the FLSP always makes pricing strategies before the LSI places 
an order, thus the FLSP sets the wholesale prices to make the LSI purchase service 
capacity only in the first stage or in both stages.  
Figs. 7-8 show the FLSP’s utility in the Basic Model, and when both the LSI and 
FLSP have loss-averse preferences, the value of the LSI’s loss-averse coefficient k  
has a great effect on the FLSP’s optimal strategies. If 1k  , the FLSP should set a 
high wholesale price in the first stage to motivate the LSI to take the second 
purchasing opportunity. Otherwise, the FLSP should make the LSI purchase only in 
the first stage by setting a relatively low first stage wholesale price compared to that 
when 1k  .  
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Fig. 9-12 show the FLSP’s optimal choice in Scenarios I to III. 
Fig. 7 Utility function of the FLSP in the 
Basic Model, k =3.1,  =0.7 
Fig. 8 Utility function of the FLSP in the 
Basic Model, k =0.7,  =0.7 
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From Fig. 7 to Fig. 12, we find that the FLSP’s optimal strategies change with 
the market signal 
ex . Comparing Fig. 11 and Fig. 12, it indicates that without the 
LSI’s loss-averse preference, the FLSP’s loss-averse preference helps to increase its 
utility. Comparing Fig. 12 with Fig. 10, when the FLSP does not have a loss-averse 
preference, and the LSI’s loss-averse coefficient 1k  , the LSI’s loss-averse 
preference decreases the FLSP’s utility. However, when 1k  , the effect is quite 
complicated. Comparing Fig. 12 with Fig. 7 and 8, we find that the FLSP can benefit 
from the loss-averse preference of the LSI and FLSP, as its utility increases greatly. 
    From Sections 6.1 and 6.2, we can see that under the same circumstances, the 
optimal strategies for the LSI and the FLSP can be different. For example, when the 
LSI’s loss-averse coefficient 1k  , the FLSP does not have a loss-averse preference, 
Fig. 11 Utility function of the FLSP in 
Scenario II,  =0.27 
Fig. 12 Utility function of the FLSP in 
Scenario III 
Fig. 9 Utility function of the FLSP in 
Scenario I, k =1.9 
Fig. 10 Utility function of the FLSP in 
Scenario I, k =0.95 
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and the market signal =200ex . The FLSP should set a lower wholesale price in the 
first stage to stimulate the LSI to only purchase in the first stage. However, the LSI 
should purchase capacity in both stages to obtain higher utility. In practice, the FLSP 
decides the wholesale prices and then the LSI decides the purchasing quantity. 
However, the LSI masters the market demand and thus has more power. Accordingly, 
both sides should take the other side’s loss-averse preference into consideration when 
making its own decisions. 
7. Conclusion and future research directions  
7.1 Main conclusions 
We have considered a two-echelon LSSC consisting of a loss averse FLSP and a 
loss averse LSI, under demand updating. We have studied the effect of the supply 
chain members’ loss-averse preferences by comparing the basic model and the three 
scenarios where one or both sides do not have loss-averse preferences. We have 
arrived at the following main conclusions: 
1. When purchasing in both stages, the LSI’s loss-averse preference does not 
affect the LSI’s optimal purchasing quantities and FLSP’s optimal wholesale prices. 
When the LSI only purchases in the first stage, and with appropriate conditions 
satisfied, the loss-averse preference of the LSI causes its order quantities to increase 
and the wholesale price to decrease. Different from Liu et al. [43] which studied the 
impact of loss aversion on the news vendor game with product substitution and found 
that each retailer’s equilibrium order quantity is decreasing with the loss aversion 
coefficient and increasing with the substitution rate,our paper finds that the LSI’s 
loss-averse preference can be of benefit to the LSI and should be used.  
2. The loss-averse preference can affect the decisions of supply chain members 
only if certain conditions are satisfied. A similar study is also mentioned in Özer et al. 
[42]. When the LSI purchases only in the first stage and k >1, the loss-averse 
preference of the FLSP can cause the wholesale price to increase in the first stage and 
the LSI’s total order quantity to decrease. When q=0, the effect of the loss-averse 
preferences can be observed. 
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3. The LSI’s total order quantity decreases with the increased service level, 
regardless of the supply chain members’ loss-averse preferences. Wholesale prices set 
by the FLSP increase with the increased service level when certain conditions are 
satisfied. 
7.2 Management insights 
Our paper considers service level in its analysis and thus is valuable for LSSC 
members, especially when they are developing procurement strategies. In addition, 
our paper also points to the impacts of the loss-averse preferences of supply chain 
members. These important conclusions can help the managers of LSI and FLSP to 
make better decisions. 
First, the LSI’s loss-averse preference will increase its order quantities under 
appropriate conditions. Therefore, if the LSI predicts that market demand is going to 
increase in the second stage, the LSI should act in a loss-averse manner. This finding 
is useful for LSIs, such as the Chinese Yuantong Express Logistics Company. The 
rapid development of e-commerce in China has increased the demand for logistics, 
indicating that Yuantong should exhibit loss-averse behavior. This requires the LSI to 
make rational decisions, and avoid individual loss aversion behavior. It requires 
enterprises to establish a set of scientific and sound decision-making systems.  
Second, when the LSI makes procurement decisions, it should not only consider 
demand updating, but should also pay attention to the loss-averse preferences of 
supply chain members. In practice, logistics enterprises have different scales and 
different levels of management. Some enterprises have standardized decision-making 
mechanisms while others rely on managers to make decisions. Therefore, supply 
chain members should pay attention to distinguish between different types of logistics 
enterprises and develop appropriate policies. The effects of loss-averse preference of 
the LSI are greater than those of the FLSP, thus the LSI should pay more attention to 
its loss-averse preference when making decisions. 
Third, the LSI, as a member in the LSSC, should also consider the effect of 
service level and the allocation of its guarantee cost on decision making. For example, 
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if the LSI pays a small part of the service-level guarantee cost, the wholesale prices 
set by the FLSP will increase with the increased service level. 
The research results from this paper are also valuable for FLSPs. In regard to 
loss-averse preferences, the FLSP should pay attention to the following three points.  
First, the FLSP can make beneficial use of the LSI’s loss-averse preference, 
because the LSI’s loss-averse preference can increase the wholesale prices.  
Second, the FLSP’s loss-averse preference causes the wholesale prices to 
increase in the first stage. However, at this point, the profits of the LSI in the second 
stage are less than those in the first stage, and the LSI has negative utility. The FLSP's 
loss aversion behavior has a negative impact on the LSI's utility. As an FLSP, 
managers should be aware of the circumstances under which their loss aversion can 
affect the decisions of supply chain members and appropriately adjust pricing 
strategies.  
Third, the FLSP’s profit is related to the logistics service level and the guarantee 
cost contribution ratio, which causes the wholesale prices to either increase or 
decrease. Therefore, before making pricing decisions, the FLSP should negotiate the 
contribution ratio with the LSI to maximize its profit. 
7.3 Limitations and future research directions  
Our paper has revealed the impacts of demand updating and loss-averse 
preferences on the LSI’s and FLSP’s decision making. However, this study also has 
some shortcomings. For example, we have assumed that the market price p  in the 
second stage is the same as that in the first stage, while in reality, the market price 
always changes. Accordingly, future work can introduce variable pricing. Second, 
buyback is not allowed in our paper. Thus, future work can expand our paper by 
allowing the LSI to return surplus capacity to the FLSP if market demand shrinks. 
Third, we have considered profit as the single factor that influences the LSI’s and 
FLSP’s loss-averse preferences. In reality, other factors can also affect the loss-averse 
preferences of supply chain members. Future work can explore LSSC capacity 
procurement problems considering more complex loss-averse behaviors. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1  
(1)The optimal solution of the LSI in the second stage 
The LSI’s utility in the second stage is: 
 2 2 2I I IU Q k    
Take the first derivative of 
2Q  with respect to  2 2IU Q  and we have: 
 
         
2
2
2 2
2
2 0
= 1+
Q
I
e e
Q
U Q
k p b f x x dx w s f x x dx
Q

 
    
   
   
As 0k  , take the second derivative of 2Q  with respect to  2 2IU Q  and we 
have: 
 
    
2
2 2
22
2
= 1+ 0
I
e
U Q
k p b s f Q x
Q

   

 
2 2( )IU Q  is a concave function on the ordering quantity in the second phase. It 
ensures the existence of optimal solution of 
2Q , let 
 2 2
2
=0
IU Q
Q


 and 
1 2
2 ( | )L e
p b w
Q F x
p b s
   
 
 
(2)The optimal solution of the FLSP in the second stage 
The FLSP’s utility in the second stage is: 
2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1( ) (1 )( ( )( (1 ) )) ( (1 ) )VU w Q w Q Q w Q w                
From the analysis in (1), the LSI’s optimal purchasing quantity in the second 
stage 
2LQ  is dependent on 2w , thus take the first derivative of 2w  with respect to 
2LQ  and we have: 
 2
2
2( | )
1L
e
w
p b
Q
p b w
f x
p b s
s

 


 
 
 
 
Take 2
2
L
w
Q

 into 
2 2( )VU w , and take the second derivative of 2w  with respect 
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to 
2 1 2( , )VU w w , and we have: 
  
  
 
2
2 2
2
2 2 2
2
2 1
2
(
1 0
)V L
e
U Q
w w p b w
p b s f x
p b s
w  
 

  
   
     
   
  
 
22( )VU w  is a concave function on 2w  in the second phase. It ensures the 
existence of the optimal solution of 
2w , let 
22
2
( )
=0V
wU
w


 and 
2 2 1( ) ( | )( ) (1 )L L L ew Q Q f x x p b s          
 
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2  
(1)The optimal solution of the LSI in the first stage 
When 
1 2=Q Q , the total utility of the LSI is: 
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
( ) (1 )( min( , ) ( ) ( ) )
( 1)( ) min( , )
I IU Q p Q x b x Q s Q x c
w Q p Q y
k
k k
       
   
 
Take the first derivative of 
1Q  with respect to 1( )IU Q  and we have: 
            1 1 1
1
1 = 1
(
1 1
)I
ek p b p b s F Q x k w pk F Q
Q
U Q


         

  
Take the second derivative of 
1Q  with respect to 1( )IU Q  and we have: 
      1
2
1 12
1
=
)
1
(
e
I k p b s f Q x
U Q
pkf Q
Q

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
 
When (1 )( ) ( | ) ( ) 0ep b s f x x pfk xk      is satisfied, 1( )IU Q  is a concave 
function on 
1Q . It ensures the existence of an optimal solution of 1Q , let 
1
1
( )
=0I
Q
Q
U

 and 
1 1 1
1
(1 )( ) ( 1)( ) (1 ( ))
( | )
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H
H e
p b w p F Q
Q F x
p b
k k k
k s
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When 
1 2Q Q , the total utility of the LSI is: 
1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2
1 1 1
( , ) (1 )( min( , ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) )
( 1)( ) min( , )
I L IU Q Q p Q x w Q Q b x Q s Q x c
w Q
k
Qk pk y


          
   
 
Take 
1 2
2 ( | )L e
p b w
Q F x
p b s
   
   
into 
1 2( , )I LU Q Q  and take the first 
derivative of 
1Q  with respect to 1 2( , )I LU Q Q , and we have:  
      1 2 2 1
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1= 1
( , )
1 2 1I L k
U Q Q
w k w k pk F Q
Q

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Take the second derivative of 
1Q  with respect to 1 2( , )I LU Q Q , and we have:  
 2
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1
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= 0I L
U Q Q
Q
pkf Q
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
 
Accordingly, when    2 12 1 1 2k w k w ks w
p b s pk
     
 
 
, 
LSI’s total 
utility decreases on 
 1 2, LQ Q , so 1LQ  ,   is MOQ. 
 
(2)The optimal solution of the FLSP in the first stage 
When 
1 2=Q Q , the total utility of the FLSP is: 
 1 1 1( 1) (1 )VU Q w Q c        
From the analysis in (1), the LSI’s optimal purchasing quantity in the first stage 
1HQ  is dependent on 1w , 
1 1 1
1
(1 )( ) ( 1)( ) (1 ( ))
( | )
(1 )( )
H
H e
p b w p F Q
Q F x
p b
k k k
k s
       
    
Thus, 
1 1 1(1 )( ) ( ) (1 )( ) ( 1)( ) (1 ( ))H e Hp b s F Q x p b w pk k k F Qk            
Take the first derivative of 
1w  with respect to 1HQ , and we have: 
1 1
1 1
1 1
(1 )( ) ( ) ( 1) ( )H HH e H
Q Q
p b s f Q x pf Q
w
k
w
k k
 
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Thus, 1
1 1 1
1
=
(1 )( ) ( ) ( )
H
H e H
Q k
w p bk s f Q x pf Qk
 
    
 
From Appendix A, (1 )( ) ( | ) ( ) 0ep b s f x x pfk xk     .
 Thus, when 1k  , 
1
1
0H
Q
w



; when 1k  , 1
1
0H
Q
w



. 
Then, take the first derivative of 
1w  with respect to VU , and we have: 
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1 1V H H
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, increases with 
1w , 
then 
1H hw w . 
If 1k  ,
2
2
1
11
2 0V H
U Q
ww






. 
VU  is a concave function of 1w . It ensures the 
existence of an optimal solution of 
1w , let 
1
=0V
U
w


 and 
1 1
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e
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When 
1 2Q Q , the total utility of the FLSP is:  
1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1( , ) (1 )( )( (1 ) ) (1 )VU w w Q w Q Q w Q               
Take
 2 2 1
( ) ( | )( ) (1 )L L L ew Q Q f x x p b s         into 1 2( , )VU w w , and 
take the first derivative of 
1w  with respect to 1 2( , )VU w w , and we have 
1
1
1
2( , ) 0L
V Q
w
U w w
 

.
1 2( , )VU w w  increases with 1w , thus 1L hw w . 
 
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 1  
From Table 2 and 3, we can get: 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1; ;L L L L L L L L hQ Q Q Q w w w w w       
Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ
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To find out the relationship among the optimal strategies of the LSI and the FLSP in 
the second stage, we first solve simultaneous Eq.(C.1) and Eq. (C.2)  
1 2
2 ( | )e
p b w
Q F x
p b s
   
                      
Eq. (C.1)  
2 2( ) ( )( ) (1 )ew Q f x x p b s                  Eq. (C.2) 
Let  
 
  
2 2
2
1
( | )
|
e
e
w p b w
F x
f x x p b s p
G
s
w
b
   

    
  
   
   Eq. (C.3) 
 2G w  is a function of 2w  . Take the second derivative of 2w  we can get: 
2
2
( ) 2
0
G w
w p b s

 
  
                  Eq. (C.4) 
Eq. (C.4) shows that 
2( )G w  is the strictly monotone increasing function of 2w  
and 
2 ( , )l hw w w . To ensure that there is at least one solution of 2w  which satisfy 
the equation (C.3), the following conditions should be satisfied: when 
2 lw w , 
( ) 0lG w   and when 2 hw w , ( ) 0hG w  . Thus the 2w  which makes 2( ) 0G w   
is the one and only optimal wholesale in the second stage. It means that:
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2;L L L L L L L LQ Q Q Q w w w w     
Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ
 
 
Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 2 
When 1 1H HQ Q
Ⅰ Ⅲ
,  | eF x x is strictly monotone increasing function: 
   1 1| |e H eHF x FQ Q xⅠ Ⅲ  
Besides,    1 11 1
I III
H HQ k Q k     
So we only consider when 1k  . We can get: 
          1 1 1 11 1 2I III I IH H e H HQ Q k p b s f x x Q kpf x kp F Q           
As 
1 1 0H H
I IIIQ Q  ，     1 12 1I IH HQ kpf x kp F Q      
Let ( ) ( ) (1 ( ))H m mkpf x kp F m     and take the second derivative of m  on 
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( )H m  we can find out that ( )H m decreases with m and 
max( ) ( )H m H  . 
Thus, when 2 ( ) (1 ( ))kpf x kp F      , 1 1H HQ Q
Ⅰ Ⅲ
. 
 
Appendix E. Proof of Theorem 3 
When 1k  , 1 1 1H h H Hw w and w w 
Ⅰ Ⅰ Ⅲ
 
When 1k  : If 1 1H Hw w
Ⅰ Ⅲ  and theorem 2 is satisfied,  
    1 1 1
(2 )( ) ( )( )
0
1 1
I I IIIe
H H H e
k p b s f x xkpf x
Q Q Q p b s f x x
k k
  
     
 
  
As 1k  , ( ) (2 )( ) ( ) 0ekpf x k p b s f x x       
 
Appendix F. Proof of Theorem 5 
From Scenario III, when neither of the LSI and the FSLP has no loss-averse and 
0q   
21
2 ( | )eL
p b w
Q F x
p b s
   
 
Ⅲ
Ⅲ  
and 2 2( ) ( )( ) (1 )L L ew Q f x x p b s        
Ⅲ Ⅲ
 
take the second derivative of  on 
2 2L Land wQ
Ⅲ Ⅲ  respectively, we can get: 
2 2 10,
2 ( )( ) 2
L L
e
w w
f x x p b s

 
 
   
    
     
Ⅲ Ⅲ
 
If 
1
0
2
  , 2 0L
w




Ⅲ
 , If 
1
1
2
  , 2 0L
w




Ⅲ
  
Similarly, when 0q  , 1 0H
Q




Ⅲ
  
and if 
1
0
2
  , then 1 0H
w




Ⅲ
 . If 
1
1
2
  , then 1 0H
w




Ⅲ
.
 
We can get the same conclusion from Scenario I. 
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